TCC-2 2018 Verizon Proxy Recommendations

1)  Election of Directors

01. S. Archambeau CEO MetricStream                                 Against

02. M. Bertolini CEO Aetna                                                    Against

03. R. Carrion CEO Popular, Inc.                                           Against

04. M. Healy Fmr. Group President Proctor & Gamble    Against

05. M. F. Keeth Fmr. EVP Royal Dutch Shell                      Against

06. L. McAdam CEO Verizon Communication, Inc.           Against

07. C. Otis, Jr. Fmr. CEO Darden Restaurants                    Against

08. R. Slater Partner, Squire Patton Boggs LLP                 Against

09. K. Tesija Fmr. EVP Target Corp.                                     Against

10. G. Wasson Fmr. CEO Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc. Against

11. G. Weaver Fmr. CEO Deloitte & Touche LLP                Against

 

2) Ratification of Appointment of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm –   For

3) Advisory Vote to Approve Executive Compensation –  Against

4) Special Shareholder Meeting –   For

Allows investors to accelerate change at a company, without the need to wait for the next annual meeting to restructure a Board of Directors or make other changes. 

5) Lobbying Activities Report –   For

We believe in full disclosure of Verizon Communication Inc.’s direct and indirect lobbying activities and expenditures.

6) Independent Chair –   For

When the CEO serves as Chairman, this arrangement may hinder the ability of the Board to monitor the CEO’s performance and to provide the CEO with objective feedback and guidance.

7) Report on Cyber Security and Data Privacy –   For

We believe it is advisable for the Board to explore integrating cyber security and data privacy metrics into executive compensation.

8) Executive Compensation Clawback Policy –  For

Recent high profile payouts underscore the need for a stronger Executive Compensation Clawback Policy. At companies like Verizon, where the vast majority of senior executive compensation is tied to financial performance, we believe incentives not to take undue risks to boost short-term profitability are appropriate.

9) Nonqualified Savings Plan Earnings –    For

Above market earnings on non-qualified accounts are not performance-based and thus do nothing to align management incentives with long-term shareholder interests. In addition, gross disparities between retirement benefits offered to senior executives and other employees risk potential moral problems and risk to corporate reputation.

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